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WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
Validity of New Building Regulations
Applicable to Existing Structures
X owns an apartment building within the corporate limits of city M.
It was constructed in 1940, at a cost of $500,000, and complied with all
existing building regulations. In 1957, there was a serious apartment
house fire in the city of M, several tenants having burned to death. This
fire attracted widespread attention and resulted in pressure upon the city
council to take measures to prevent similar future disasters. The city
council therefore passed a building regulation requiring a certain class of
apartment buildings to install sprinkler systems. X, who feels he has
spent sufficient funds to make his building safe, discovers it will cost
him $20,000 to install the required sprinkler system in his building and
will cause his tenants considerable aggravation. Therefore, X decides to
contest the validity of the building regulation.
The interest of X in the above situation is that of the private property
owner, striving to maintain the right to do with his property as he
chooses, usually with an eye to his pocketbook. Opposed to this is the
interest of the general public, acting through a legislative organ, in pro-
tecting the health, welfare and safety of its citizens. X's argument is that
when the building was erected, it complied with the law. The public
interest argument is that when surrounding circumstances change, the
law must adjust to meet the new circumstances.
When the issue is litigated, the court must decide which interest shall
prevail. The purpose of this note is to analyze the attitude of the courts
toward each of the interests involved, and to see how they have reacted
to various arguments advanced by the property owner in his fight against
the building regulation.
LANDMARK CASES - AN INCIPIENT ATTTUDE
The landmark cases in this area reveal an attitude that has prevailed
to the present, that unless the building owner has extremely strong
grounds of objection, the regulation will be sustained if based upon some
reasonable exercise of the police power. Obviously, the word "reason-
able" suggests no concrete test, and indeed the courts in these early cases
have not ventured any. There are of course numerous advantages to
having black and white delineations, but the courts early recognized that
in this area a social problem was involved and each situation depended
primarily upon its own facts. In other words, what is required to make
a specific building safe from fire, from crowded and unwholesome living
conditions, and from obnoxious sewage conditions, depends upon the type
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of building involved, what it is used for, its location, the number of in-
habitants, its age, etc. Keeping this in mind, it seems sensible to avoid
any set formula, and the attitude of the courts in recognizing that the
problem is for the legislative branch is commendable.
A landmark case illustrating this attitude is City of Seattle v. Hinck-
ley,1 in which a municipal ordinance was passed requiring all buildings
of a certain class, whether erected prior or subsequent to the passage of
the ordinance, to be equipped with a specified type of fire escape. The
building owner contended this violated a vested right, since he had met
all fire escape requirements when the building was erected. In rejecting
this argument the court said: "There is no such thing as an inherent or
vested right to imperil the health or impair the safety of the community. "2
The fight against slums and similar poor living conditions, although
a frustrating one, has not been hampered by the courts. Quite possibly
the strong emotional argument that the statute in question is designed to
alleviate shameful living conditions has influenced the court. In any
event the early cases generally upheld this remedial type of legislation.
In the famous case of Health Department v. Trinity Church,a the court
sustained a statute, passed after the defendant's building was erected, re-
quiring tenement houses to have a supply of water on each floor. The
defendant argued that to comply would cost him money which was a
taking of property without due process. The court held no rights of the
owner are violated if the sum required to be spent is reasonable under the
circumstances.
The early cases also show an equal sympathy to sanitation regula-
tions. Again it is impossible to determine to what degree this attitude
stems from the fact that Americans are extremely "sanitation conscious,"
and how much stems from pure legal reasoning. Either way, the results
seem proper, since the courts are sustaining the wishes of the citizenry
as manifested through the legislative branch.
Illustrative of this phase of the problem is Commonwealth v. Rob-
erts.4 In this case a Massachusetts statute required certain buildings, if
situated on streets with public sewers, to have sufficient waterclosets con-
nected with the sewer. The court interpreted the statute to apply to
houses built before its passage, and held such fact did not make it un-
constitutional 5
1. 40 Wash. 468, 82 Pac. 747 (1905).
2. Id. at 471, 82 Pac. at 748.
3. 145 N.Y. 32, 39 N.E. 833 (1895).
4. 155 Mass, 281, 29 N.E. 522 (1892).
5. See Spear v. Ward, 199 Ala. 105; 74 So. 27 (1917); City of Leeds v. Avram,
244 Ala. 427, 14 So. 2d 728 (1943); Schmidt v. Village of Kimberly, 74 Idaho 48,
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There can be no doubt that the statute in question is within the con-
stitutional powers of the legislature as a police power. It is an act for the
preservation of the public health, and relates to the disposal of one of the
most dangerous forms of sewage.
This early attitude of the courts in cases concerning health and fire
hazards was probably a natural one, since it is appalling to the average
person to see slums, firetrap buildings and the like. This sympathetic
attitude has been strengthened by the additional consideration of public
morals, stemming from a realization that slums are prolific breeders of
such evils as juvenile delinquency, crime, and perverted moral standards.
An apt illustration of this influence is Adamec v. Post.7 In this case
plaintiff contended the New York Multiple Dwelling Law, which was
made applicable to existing buildings and required them to be kept in
conformity with new standards enacted by the legislature, was arbitrary,
unreasonable, and a taking of property without due process. In sustain-
ing the statute as reasonable, the court stated:
... [T]here has come a general recognition that dwellings which are un-
safe or unsanitary or which fail to provide the amenities essential to de-
cent living, may work injury not only to those who live there, but to the
general welfare.8
Keeping this general attitude in mind, we turn to the treatment of
specific objections raised by building owners.
PARTICULAR OBJECTIONS
Retroactive Law
Regardless of the ominous ring of the phrase "retroactive law" in
other areas, in the field of building regulations this objection has attained
little, if any, weight. Since most states have no constitutional prohibition
against retrospective laws that do not impinge upon a vested right,9 this
objection is usually coupled with other stronger defenses as a secondary
issue. Consequently the courts have passed upon it with cursory treat-
ment, making it difficult to pin down the exact grounds of decision. But
one of three general reasons usually is discernible, namely 1) retroactive
256, P.2d 515 (1953); City of Nokomis v. Sullivan, 153 N.E.2d 48 (Ill. 1958);
Nourse v. City of Russellville, 257 Ky. 525, 78 S.W.2d 761 (1935); Fristoe v.
City of Crowley, 142 La. 393, 76 So. 812 (1917); Fenton v. Atlantic City, 90 N.J.L.
403, 103 At. 695 (1917); Harrington v. Board of Aldermen, 20 R.I. 233, 38 Ad.
1 (1897).
6. Note 4, supra, at 282, 29 N.E. at 523. See also Tenement House Dep't. v.
Moeschen, 179 N.Y. 325, 72 N.E. 231 (1904).
7. 273 N.Y. 250, 7 N.E.2d 120 (1937).
8. Id. at 254, 7 N.E.2d at 122.
9. 6 MCQUILLAN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 20.70 (3d ed., 1949).
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laws are permissible; 2) it is not a retroactive law at all; or 3) it is the
type of retroactive law that is proper. An example is Clarke v. City of
Chicago,10 in which the plaintiff sued for damages for the dosing of his
theater, resulting from a failure to comply with certain ordinances. Plain-
tiff claimed the city could not retroactively apply the ordinances. The
court held that since the provision was necessary for the protection of
persons attending public theaters, it could apply retroactively.
This case dearly indicates the danger involved if the courts were to
recognize retroactivity as a valid constitutional objection. A person could
build a structure, comply with all laws in force at the time, and be free
from future regulation. But buildings commonly last a hundred years
or more, and in the intervening time a multitude of new ideas, inventions,
and materials may decree a completely different type of protection. Ob-
viously the thought of using the plumbing of 100 years ago is revolting.
But if the courts recognized retroactivity as a valid objection, this result
would follow in some cases. Therefore the defense is usually disposed
of by one method or another.
In Daniels v. City of Portland,' an ordinance required dwelling
rooms each to have a window as a condition precedent to occupancy.
The court answeredl the building owner's argument that it was a retro-
active law by saying the ordinance destroyed no vested right, and hence
was not retroactive. A similar result with slightly different reasoning
was reached in Kansas City Gunning Advertisement Co. v. Kansas City.'2
The court held an ordinance strictly regulating billboards was not retro-
active since it interferred with no vested right, and operated prospectively
from the time of passage.' 3
Other arguments of unconstitutionality on the ground that the regu-
lation is retroactive have been met by holding the ordinance is valid be-
cause the "general welfare" is involved,14 or because the regulation is a
"reasonable and a proper exercise of the police power."'15 Regardless of
the diversity of reasoning, the conclusion is inescapable that retroactivity
is not a favored defense. What is or is not retroactive is largely a mat-
10. 159 Ill. App. 20 (1910).
11. 124 Ore. 677, 265 Pac. 790 (1928).
12. 240 Mo. 659, 144 S.W. 1099 (1912).
13. For cases dealing with the retroactive argument as applied to "handrail statutes"
(the issue usually arises in negligence cases) see Rau v. Redwood City Woman's
Club, 111 Cal. App. 2d 546, 245 P.2d 12 (1952); Dewolf v. Marshall Field and Co.,
201 III. App. 542 (1916); Fay v. Allied Stores Corp., 43 Wash. 2d 512, 262 P.2d
189 (1953) - all sustaining the ordinance.
14. City of Sr Louis v. Warren Commission & Investment Co., 226 Mo. 148, 126
S.W. 166 (1910).
15. Abbate Bros., Inc. v. City of Chicago, 11 Ill. 2d 337, 142 NlE.2d 691 (1957).
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ter of judicial opinion. If the interest of the property owner were fa-
vored, a court, in its discretion, could call building regulations that ap-
plied to existing buildings retroactive as interfering with a vested right.
The fact that they refuse to do so indicates that the interest of the public
is the one favored.
Due Process
Due process has been a catch-all objection including such arguments
as 1) the regulation is not a valid exercise of the police power; 2) the
regulation constitutes a taking of property without compensation; 3) the
regulation is unreasonable; 4) the regulation is invalid because the owner
was afforded no notice or opportunity to be heard. A survey of various
cases indicates that this objection, while of some solace to the building
owner, has been generally repudiated as a constitutional objection to
building regulations applicable to existing buildings. This is illustrated
by Queenside Hills Realty Co. v. Saxl.16 In 1940, appellant constructed
a four-story building which complied with all applicable laws. Under a
1944 law appellant was ordered to install an automatic wet pipe sprinkler
system. Appellant alleged the market value of the building was about
$25,000, the cost of compliance would be about $7,500, and that the
benefits to be obtained were negligible. The court held the order was a
reasonable exercise of the police power, stating:
It is for the legislature to decide what regulations are needed to reduce
fire hazards to the minimum. Many types of social legislation diminish
the value of the property which is regulated.
As indicated previously, the courts have been liberal with regulations
which attempt to prohibit the use of outdated sanitation devices. Thus
it has been held that it is not a taking of property without due process to
suppress the use of privy vaults,17 even though no notice was given,'8 on
the theory that this is such a nuisance that may be abated by summary
proceedings. In the area of fire control regulation, such far-reaching
ordinances as one requiring the demolition of a building because it was
a fire hazard have been sustained'9 in the face of a due process argument.
And even when the owner is required to expend huge amounts, he has
found little sympathy with the courts. For example, in Richards v. City
of Columbia,20 the plaintiff was required to repair his rental property
16. 328 U.S. 80 (1945).
17. Sprigg v. Town of Garrett Park, 89 Md. 406, 43 Ad. 813 (1899).
18. Harrington v. City of Providence, 20 R.I. 233, 38 Ad. 1 (1897).
19. City of Houston v. Lurie, 148 Tex. 391, 224 S.W.2d 871 (1949).
20. 227 S.C. 538, 88 S.E.2d 683 (1955).
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under an ordinance containing specific standards, which was passed after
his building was built. His costs would have been $575-750 per dwell-
ing, and he owned over a hundred dwellings. The court held the ordi-
nance was reasonable,21 and was not a taking of property without com-
pensation, "since all property is held subject to reasonable regulation by
the State. '2'  This case plainly illustrates that the early attitude has lost
none of its vigor, and that the overtones working in favor of these regu-
lations are powerful enough to prevail against the most appealing of
arguments.
But it would be misleading and ludicrous to convey the idea that all
regulations have been and will continue to be sustained in all situations.
In cases in which the building owner has some peculiar factor in his
favor, he has been able to prevail. Illustrative of this proposition is Cen-
tral Savings Bank v. New York,25 in which a defense was sustained on
the issue of notice. A statute allowed city authorities to make certain
repairs on old-law tenements and assess the cost as a lien prior to existing
mortgages, without affording mortgagees a hearing as to the reasonable-
ness of the proceedings or the expenses. The court held this was a tak-
ing of property without due process and impaired the mortgagee's con-
tract with the mortgagor in violation of the contract clause. And in
Crossman v. City of Galveston24 the court held the owner of a lawfully
constructed building has such a vested property right in the building that
he could not be denied the right to repair it to keep it fit for use in lieu
of demolition.25
While due process has been relatively the most successful defense, it
seems to afford small comfort to the building owner. Even in the Cross-
man case where the owner prevailed on his argument of a vested prop-
erty right to repair a building, he was faced with the financial onus of
repairing his building. Even a great financial burden to the building
21. See also Bellerive Investment Co. v. Kansas City, 321 Mo. 969, 13 S.W.2d
628 (1929).
22. Richards v. City of Columbia, 227 S.C. 538, 553, 88 S.E.2d 683, 690 (1955).
Two of the five judges dissented reasoning that the ordinance was an unreasonable
exercise of the police power due to the excessive costs involved.
23. 279 N.Y. 266, 18 N.E.2d 151 (1938).
24. 112 Tex. 303, 247 S.W. 810 (1923).
25. But see Baird v. Bradley, 109 Cal. App. 2d 365, 240 P.2d 1016 (1952), in
which a statute and ordinance preventing the repair of buildings damaged by fire to
an extent in excess of 509 of their existing value, and in excess of 60% of their
physical proportions, unless the alterations and repairs would conform to all require-
ments for new buildings, were held as not a taking of property without due process.
See also Fidelity & Guaranty Insurance Corp. v. Mondzelewski, 49 Del. 306, 115
A.2d 697 (1955); Glenn v. The Mayor of Baltimore, 5 Gill. & J. 424 (Md. 1833).
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owner will not help his argument, in the absence of other cogent factors.
In these cases especially is the attitude of the courts dearly manifested.
Equal Protection
In a few cases the building owner has had available an "equal pro-
tection" argument. However, the favorable attitude of the courts to-
ward building regulations coupled with the general law under the equal
protection clause (i.e. if a civil rights question is not involved the dis-
crimination will not be scrutinized too closely) has generally nullified this
as a persuasive objection. For example, in Bellerive Investment Co. v.
Kansas City,26 an ordinance was passed providing that no dwelling place
could have a garage underneath that stored more than three automobiles.
Plaintiff, who owned an apartment building with a garage underneath
for tenant parking, contended that this ordinance violated the equal pro-
tection clause because it discriminated against garages containing more
than three cars. The court held it was a reasonable classification on the
theory that the greater the number of cars the greater the danger of fires
from gasoline leakage etc.27
OTHER FACroRs
Certain other factors may be present in a given case, which, though
not determinative of the issue, may strengthen the building owner's
case.28 But it must be noted in this type of case that there are other
strong factors present, and also the risk of nullifying the statute or ordi-
nance was not too dangerous to the public. This is illustrated by Masonic
Temple Assn. v. City of Chicago,2 9 in which it was held that the city
was without power to order the reconstruction of a building for fire
safety at a tremendous cost when the building was not used for a public
purpose (as are theaters, concert halls, etc.) and the owner had complied
with existing ordinances when the building was built, and the building
was reasonably safe in its present condition. Thus the factor of a private
building is worth some weight, but it is probably the combination of all
the factors involved that was determinative of the issue.
The fact that the building owner is plagued with some extenuating
circumstances may also help his case. For example, in Realty Revenue
Corp. v. Wilson3 ° plaintiff's injunction was granted to enjoin the Com-
26. 321 Mo. 969, 13 S.W.2d 628 (1929).
27. See also Queenside Hills Realty Co. v. Saxl, 328 U.S. 80 (1946).
28. For a case realing with the "questionable motives" of the legislature, see Dob-
bins v. City of Los Angeles, 195 U.S. 223 (1904).
29. 131 Ill. App. 1 (1907).




missioner of Housing from enforcing an order requiring plaintiff's build-
ing to be vacated. Plaintiff, whose building was valued at $800,000,
could not comply with the defendant's order because of material securi-
ties imposed by the Federal government during wartime exigencies. But
here again plaintiff had another strong factor in that the building in its
present condition was reasonably safe.
As in any case dealing with a statute, the building owner may have
an argument, based upon statutory construction, that the statute was not
intended to apply to his building. Here particularly each case turns
upon its own facts, and prior cases are of little value.
CONCLUSION
Unquestionably, issues of public safety, health and welfare are for the
legislative branch to deal with. With the age of huge and crowded
municipalities, with the advent of modern and efficient means of sani-
tation, with new concepts and awareness of health problems, with new
devices and safeguards for the prevention and control of fires, both local
and state legislative organs have moved heavily into the area of building
regulation, to a degree that it is accepted as a matter of course. Giving
way to this tide is the protection of property rights, i.e. the right to do
with one's property as one chooses. Courts have recognized in theory,
and implemented in the decided cases, that the public interest is para-
mount in general to private property rights. The duty of government is
to protect its citizens. Although the private property owner is not with-
out some protection, the distinct tendency of the courts is to allow the
legislative branch to handle the problem as it sees fit. Only when some
peculiar factor is in-favor of the property owner, and the consequence of
holding the regulation invalid is not too detrimental to the public, will the
property owner prevail. Otherwise his only recourse is the common sense
of the legislative control
Despite this fact, courts today are still filled with litigation on this
matter. Obviously, each case turns upon its own facts, as is necessary in
dealing with concepts like "due process," "equal protection," "reasonable-
ness," and "valid exercise of the police power." No more definite rule
can be formulated than that the regulation is valid if "reasonable and not
arbitrary." The above cases indicate that the burden of proving "unrea-
sonable and arbitrary," or some other defense, is a difficult one.
ROBERT F. ORTH
31. See for example City of St. Louis v. Warren Commission & Investment Co.,
226 Mo. 148, 126 S.W. 166 (1910).
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